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Abstract—Product innovation is a risky activity, but when successful,
it enables large software companies accrue high profits and leapfrog
the competition. Internal startups have been promoted as one way
to foster product innovation in large companies, which allows them to
innovate as startups do. However, internal startups in large companies
are challenging endeavours despite of the promised benefits. How large
software companies can leverage internal startups in software product
innovation is not fully understood due to the scarcity of the relevant
studies. Based on a conceptual framework that combines the elements
from the Lean startup approach and an internal corporate venturing
model, we conducted a case study of a large software company to
examine how a new product was developed through the internal startup
effort and struggled to achieve the desired outcomes set by the man-
agement. As a result, the conceptual framework was further developed
into a Lean startup-enabled new product development model for large
software companies.
Index Terms—software product innovation, internal startup, Lean
startup, large software companies, case study
1 INTRODUCTION
It is widely accepted that product innovation is vital to
companies to sustain their competitive advantages (e.g.
[1], [2], [3]). Product innovation refers to the creation and
introduction of new (technologically new or significantly
improved) products which are different from existing prod-
ucts [4], [5], [6]. Through product innovation, companies
are able to create new market and entry barriers, challenge
market leaders and leapfrog competition [7]. Companies
are able to accrue high profit because at the time a new
product is released, there is no competition in the market
until imitators produce similar products [8].
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Developing product innovation is a risky activity [9],
[10]. Many companies are too risk-averse to engage in any
innovation initiatives [11]. As in automated factories, people
in large companies are trained to do prescribed and specific
tasks reliably. Hence, any endeavour to change the status-
quo will emerge resistance. The implementation of an inno-
vative idea must compete with other product development
activities [12], [13]. This is the case for software industry,
too. Little attention is given to product innovativeness [14].
The studies on corporate entrepreneurship suggest that
internal startup is an ideal environment to nurture inno-
vation and entrepreneurship in large companies [15]. Al-
though the internal startup is still operating within the
corporation, the way of working is different with respect
to the traditional research and development (R&D) system.
An internal startup takes the responsibility from end to end;
from finding a business idea to developing a new product
and introducing it to market [16]. Therefore, internal startup
is also seen as a learning process to create new competence
different from the main business. Competence makes a
difference among companies in yielding the outputs.
Even though an increasing number of software compa-
nies have adopted internal startup for the purpose of prod-
uct innovation [17], practicing startup initiative within large
companies can be a challenging endeavour [18]. Very few
studies have investigated how large software companies
can utilise internal startup to improve their competence and
capability of product innovation. Based on this observation,
the research question investigated in this study is: “How
do large companies leverage internal startup in software product
innovation?
To answer the research question, a conceptual frame-
work based on the Lean startup approach [19] and an
internal corporate venture model [20] is constructed. The
framework enables a systematic analysis of a case study
conducted in a large software company, to better understand
the key processes of new product development through an
internal startup in large software companies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The
related work is described in Section 2. Section 3 presents the
conceptual framework used in this study. Section 4 intro-
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2duces the case studied and describes the research approach
followed. Section 5 presents the results, which are further
discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper with
the summary of the major findings and an outline of future
work.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Software product innovation
Like any modern dynamic business, software industry is
highly influenced by its knowledge intensive and technol-
ogy driven nature [21]. Continual reliance on old or existing
technology will jeopardise the market position of a company
[22]. Hence, companies must seek innovation as it disrupts
former key players and creates new business or markets. In-
novation is an iterative process that starts with identification
of new market needs, which leads to the development of a
solution that fits to that needs [23], [24].
Software product innovation is concerned with introduc-
ing new software product to an existing or new market [25].
In software industry, product innovation occurs in either
software or hardware development, or both, which raises
strategic challenges for software companies [26]. New com-
panies emerge with innovative solutions. Some established
companies manage to respond and survive, e.g., Google
and Samsung in the mobile device and service domain,
but others lose their business e.g. Nokia. Another example
is open source software (OSS) [27]. Through OSS, many
startups are able to enter a market and become a threat to
the market leaders e.g. Linux against Microsoft Windows,
Mozilla against Microsoft Internet Explorer, etc.
In the context of innovation in large software compa-
nies, Misra et al. [28] develop a goal-driven measurement
framework to measure innovation activities in companies.
The framework adopted the Goal-Question-Metric (GQM)
approach to define the goals of innovation program and the
metrics to measure their achievement. Although they pro-
vided a set of metrics for measuring innovation, the study
did not present a clear methodology on how they defined
the goal, questions and metrics. Nor did it explain clearly
the relationship between the suggested metrics and innova-
tion. In addition, it is still unclear what innovation activities
constitute. A study of Gorschek et al. [29] proposes a model
for an early stage innovation, which emphasises on ideation
and selection prior to actual development. However, the un-
derstanding of the end-to-end development from ideation to
commercialisation is yet to be fully achieved.
2.2 Internal startup
The literature of corporate entrepreneurship shows that to
generate revenue streams and values for shareholders, large
companies are engaged in either internal startup (or inter-
nal corporate venture [30]) or external startup (or external
corporate venture) [31], or both. external startup usually
includes joint venturing (e.g. Sony Ericsson), acquisition
(e.g. the acquisition of Skype by Microsoft or Whatsapp
by Facebook) and corporate venture capital (e.g. Google
Venture, Intel Capital). On the contrary, in the case of inter-
nal startup, innovation is generated through a separate and
dedicated entity which is operated within an established
company and using resources that are solely under the
control of the company [31], [32].
Different models have been developed to explain the
actual process of internal startup in companies. Burgelman
[20] identifies four major processes in a process model of
internal startup: definition, impetus, strategic context and
structural context. There are also three roles involved in
the processes: corporate management, new venture division
(NVD) management and venture lead (or intrapreneur). The
definition process occurs in the R&D department which is
responsible to generate ideas for new business. The new
idea combines the available technology and the market
needs which should not be in line with the current corporate
strategy. In this process, NVD plays an important role to
coach the intrapreneurs in developing new business. To
move from definition to impetus process, a product cham-
pion is required to mobilise resources needed. The impe-
tus process refers to the entrepreneurial and organisational
stages of development. It involves two stages: strategic forc-
ing and strategic building. In strategic forcing, intrapreneurs
are focusing on commercialisation of the new product. For
the continuation of the impetus process, strategic building
process takes place. Through strategic building activities,
intrapreneurs are able to overcome the limitations of one-
product and maintain growth rate, as required by the man-
agement. To establish its sustainability, the new business
must get support strategically. Since any startup efforts may
emerge from the bottom, corporate management applies
selecting mechanism to ensure that only the ones that show
the potential for fast growth have more opportunities to
survive. Therefore, in the strategy context, intrapreneurs
attempt to convince corporate management that the new
business area can be part of current corporate strategy. Even
when the current strategy cannot accommodate it, they must
convince them to extend the strategy to protect the initiative.
Therefore, an organisational champion plays an important
role to communicate with the management about the new
business area.
The study by Garud and Van de Ven [33] develops a
model based on trial-and-error learning to overcome the un-
certainty and ambiguity of the internal startup process. Be-
fore embarking on next activities, an intrapreneur evaluates
the outcomes of prior activities. If the outcome is positive,
the intrapreneur proceeds to the next activities, otherwise a
change to plan is needed. A champion from corporation is
needed when a series of negative outcomes occur or major
environmental changes happen. The plan is reviewed to
seek for alternative activities. Thus, the champion serves as
a mentor to guide the changes in the plan.
A recent internal startup model was introduced by
Breuer [18]. She argues that there are five activities in spec-
ifying business model for a new venture: exploration, elab-
oration, evaluation, experimentation and evolution. How-
ever, the framework assumes that intrapreneurs already
have identified the values that will be delivered to the cus-
tomers. In reality, it is the customer values that intrapreneurs
must seek and validate first [34].
In summary, the current internal startup process models
focus more on the resource-based view of the company. The
model from Burgelman [20] acknowledges that the idea of
new business is the combination of technology and market
3needs. However, the model does not give any clue how
this can achieve the problem/solution fit. Also it does not
recognise the learning process in developing a new product.
Both models from [33] and [18] are taking into account
the learning process to create knowledge. They are able to
describe the dynamics of creating new business but fail to
explain the interaction between the internal startup and the
parent company.
3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
To guide the study process to answer our research question,
we drew upon the Lean startup approach, which has been
suggested by [19]. It is a hypothesis-driven approach [35]
which aims at achieving the problem/solution fit first and
then the product/market fit. To capture customer value, an
entrepreneur start a feedback loop that turns an idea into
a product then learn whether the business hypotheses are
valid or not. This can be done by developing a minimum
viable product (MVP) using an agile method and collecting
customer feedback on the product. The feedback becomes
the input to validate the hypotheses and improve the prod-
uct. As the result, the startup might pursue a new direction
of the business, called pivot in the Lean startup term, or
continue and scale the proven business model. Pivot is
common to any startup, since it could prevent the startup
from bankruptcy if time between pivots is minimised. Even
though originally conceived for standalone startups, the
Lean startup approach was claimed to be useful in large
corporate settings as well [19].
To guide the empirical study, we constructed a concep-
tual framework by bringing together the elements from
Burgelman’s internal startup process model [20] and the
Lean startup approach [35]. Table 1 shows the major pro-
cesses and their related activities. In this framework, the in-
novation initiative can be either top down (top management
driven) or bottom up (employee driven).
4 RESEARCH APPROACH
The present study aims at developing a good understanding
on how large software companies leverage internal startup
in their software product innovation. Due to the complex
nature of the research phenomenon and the intention to
achieve an in-depth understanding of it, a single case study
[36] is considered a suitable research approach. The criteria
to select a case company are: (1) the company develops
software in-house, (2) the company has at least one dedi-
cated team that is responsible from the ideation to commer-
cialisation of a new software; and (3) the area of the new
software product falls out of the current main product line.
The unit of analysis in this study is a development team of
new software.
4.1 Case company and context
The company under study is F-Secure, a large Finnish cyber
security and privacy company. F-Secure was established in
1998. Currently, F-Secure has more than 900 employees in
25 countries around the globe. Its products are available
from over 6000 resellers and 200 operators in more than
40 countries. Tens of millions of users all over the world are
using its products. In 2014, F-Secure generates revenue of
137 million and earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) of
23.3 million.
Over the years, F-Secure has a long experience in various
internal innovation e.g. ground up innovation, 10% free
time, hackathons. In 2012, F-Secure was running a growth
strategy exercise to explore a new opportunity area, which
was people protection. An internal startup team was es-
tablished to find a concrete idea for new software product
around people protection, called Lokki. A concept design
was pitched to corporate management in December 2012.
Lokki was released in July 2013 publicly. The timeline of
the product development is shown in Fig. 1. In Summer
2013, the corporate management decided to change the
company’s strategy. Lokki was no longer within the scope
of the strategy. F-Secure decided to continue the develop-
ment as an open source project, collaborating with leading
universities in Europe and US and Facebook.. Based on the
criteria described previously, F-Secure is a suitable case for
this study.
4.2 Data collection and analysis
The conceptual framework presented in Table 1 serves as the
theoretical lens for the investigation of the case, acting as a
sensitising and sense-making device that guides the data
collection and analysis processes. It was used to frame the
interview questions, and enabled a holistic understanding
of the dynamics between the internal startup and other
entities inside the company. As a result, the framework
was instantiated, modified or extended to better explain the
empirical observations.
Semi-structured interviews were used as the primary
data collection method [37]. To better understand the phe-
nomenon, eight employees with different roles in F-Secure
were interviewed (see Table 2). Each interview lasted ap-
proximately 45-60 minutes. All interviews were transcribed
verbatim. Field notes were taken during the interviews.
Other supporting materials, such as internal corporate docu-
ments, presentations, white papers, etc., were also collected,
to help achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the
case.
The data analysis process was conducted iteratively as
encouraged by the grounded theory methodology [38]. The
interview data was coded line by line with the priori codes
[39], which focused the analysis around the innovation
activities and their impacts on the internal startup team
and the company. The documents obtained from the inter-
viewees and field notes were also included in the coding
steps, which allowed us to triangulate the interview data.
During the axial coding, we sorted the coded materials into
key processes as described by the framework, the actors
who performed the activities and identified the factors
that linked between two processes. The initial codes used
during the analysis and coding phase were derived from
the conceptual framework as shown in Table 1.
5 FINDINGS
As shown in the timeline, the team did two iterations in
their development process. The first iteration started with
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Conceptual framework
Major pro-
cess
Description Key activities
Vision Setting up the vision Envision: Adopting the Lean startup model, the innovation initiative starts with envision, where
intrapreneurs set the vision and translates the vision into hypotheses. To do this, they need two
things: authorisation from corporate management and coaches from NVD management on how to
turn the vision into successful business.
Steer Validating hypotheses The initiative needs a product champion to get further resources. Once it gets approval from
top management, the build-measure-learn loop takes place to validate all hypotheses. Base on the
learning, intrapreneurs have two options: pivot or persevere (then scale). When all the hypotheses
are valid, then it is the time to integrate the new business into the company portfolio.
Accelerate Leveraging the new
product into strategic
context
In this process, there are two activities: selection and rationalising. To control innovation initiatives
in the company, corporate management uses selecting mechanism. Only the initiatives that have
greater potential impact get continuous support. In rationalising process, the intrapreneurs must
convince corporate management to change the strategy to accommodate the new business. In
parallel, the NVD management plays an important role to delineate the new business in the current
strategy. Therefore, organisational championship is needed to continuously communicate with
corporate management about the development of new business area.
2012
2014
 Project 
kick-off
Sept 2012: 
Product concept 
design
Nov 2012: 
Online survey
Dec 2012: 
Pitch to 
Management
Jan 2013:
Productisation 
decision
Feb 2013:
Focus group
Mar 2013:
Concept design
Apr 2013:
Development 
begins
May 2013:
1st demo to 
management
Jun 2013:
Internal release
Jul 2013:
1.0 release
Nov 2013:
2.0 release
Dec 2013:
3.0 release
Released as 
open source 
project
Fig. 1. Project timeline
TABLE 2
Background information of interviewees
Role Years of experi-
ence at F-Secure
Role and responsibility
Chief Information
Officer (CIO)
>15 Part of leadership team,
heading R&D operation
Team Lead >5 Leading the internal
startup team
Director >6 Heading innovation op-
eration
Senior User Experi-
ence Designer
>4 Conceptualising the ap-
plications and creating
visual user experience
design for mobile and
desktop application
Senior Manager >8 Product line manager
and software architect
Manager >5 Managing ground-up
innovation
Lead Software En-
gineer
>7 Leading software devel-
opment team
Software Engineer >5 Server-side software de-
veloper
the product concept design in September 2012 until they
conducted the focus group. After the focus group they
learned that the customers wanted Lokki. Thus, the team
switched to Lokki and went back to concept design in
March 2013, and went through another iteration of product
development. In the following sub-sections the findings of
this study were presented in detail, structured according
to the conceptual framework (as shown in Table 1): Vision,
Steer and Accelerate.
5.1 Vision
One senior employee (who later became the team lead) was
assigned to prepare the concept creation within the people
protection area, and to build the internal startup team. The
team lead wanted to have all the competences in the team,
e.g. developers, user experience designers, marketing, tester,
etc. Therefore, he did one-to-one interviews to recruit the
team members internally. It actually took 2 months to find
the members with entrepreneurial mindset. It was not easy
to build an entrepreneurial team from the existing pool of
employees, because:
“They all wanted to hear that nothing is gonna happen
and we’re gonna be great for years. The problem is I
cannot tell that. I mean, I don’t know what’s gonna
happening.” [Senior Manager]
The internal startup team were dedicated to this project
only. All the team members still got their monthly salary.
The team had as least dependencies to the corporate as
possible to shorten development cycle and reduce time-to-
market. It is different from a R&D unit since the internal
startup operates only in the scope defined for them:
“[The startup is] controlled, because the focus is inno-
vation. ... the business case is approved, and they are
running towards the target under that business case
approval and making experiments, maybe even pivot.”
[CIO]
5The team got a mandate from management to seek seeds
for new product around people protection area, something
that the company did not have yet. The team developed
some scenarios of potential problems and identified the
potential solutions. Eventually, as the team lead described,
after “stealing some hour from some people in the company who
get interested in this idea and ... working some afternoons, some
evenings”, the team landed with the idea of family location
sharing. Using the family location sharing application, par-
ents are able to see the locations of their kids or other family
members. Therefore, if something bad happens to their kids,
they can easily locate the position and help them.
The new idea was validated through an online survey
which was published globally, to see if it resonates in the
best way with the users. The questionnaire results showed
that there was a big interest for the potential users to have
a software that allows them to know where their family
members or friends are. The new idea was then pitched
to corporate management on December 2012. However, the
new idea was questioned by the product management who
was afraid of cannibalising:
“Then the first question from product management will
be, ok, are we cannibalising anything? ... They do not
want to harm the business which [has been] successful
...” [Senior Manager]
At that moment, it was still unclear to the team what the
value proposition of the new product was. However, there
was one member of the top management supported this
concept. The management liked the concept and authorised
the team to start developing the new product for several
platforms.
The role of NVD management to coach the team was
not recognised in the case company. It was the first time for
the company to work in a startup manner to develop new
product. Nobody in the company knew how it should work:
“Yes, I was told to work like a lean start-up, ... than
I was discussing this with [the top management] and
‘What do you actually mean by that?’ He doesn’t really
know, but [the lead’s name] go and find out...” [Team
Lead]
In the case of F-Secure, the corporate management took
the responsibility of product championing because they
were deeply involved in the vision process. Hence, the
team did not have any difficulties in resource procurement
e.g. people, budget, infrastructure etc., which were already
available in the company. In addition, they got backup from
one member of corporate management who supported the
new idea.
5.2 Steer
Using flip-chart prototyping, the team developed three dif-
ferent product concepts. Six families with their kids from
internal employees were invited to a focus group to evaluate
those concepts. It was surprising for the team to find out
that the concept that they thought were be the best was not
selected by the participants:
“We were sure that they would select this one [the other
product] but they select this one [Lokki]... They selected
not the one which we internally hoped, wanted for.”
[Lead Software Engineer]
Since the team was responsible for the whole processes,
they managed to have close communication with the users.
They got 650 emails from the users asking for new features
or improvement. This enabled them to identify which fea-
tures brought value to the users, and hence needed to be
implemented. The request for new features also came from
the management or the team itself, but not all of them were
put into the backlog. It was the team lead’s decision as to
which feature would be implemented in certain release.
During the development process, the team broke some
rules in the company. An example of this was the team
wanted to launch the product in Russia. They needed the
localisation ready on a certain date. If they followed the
standard process, they would not be able to meet the dead-
line. Hence, one team member who spoke Russian as his
mother tongue did the localisation by translating all the
marketing texts by himself. This unusual way of working
enabled the team to reduce the development time cycle, but
raised an internal conflict inside the company because some
people felt that the team had trespassed their territory:
“... a formal document that writes ’your title is product
marketing manager and your job is creating something.
Your responsibilities are this, this, and this. And you
report to this person’. So, this person sends me that
document that had been defined for her when she had a
job in the company. And then she said ’hey [Team lead’s
name] you are doing in your team the tasks that belong
to me’. And I said ’yeah, but you choose not [to do the
task]’, and she was really really angry.”[Team Lead]
The MVP was demoed to the management in May 2013.
It had three main features: invite other users to the close
group, being able to see them in the map, and being able
to show/hide the location. Then the team did a survey in
some schools to test the product and gather feedback from
the parents and children. The first version was released
for iTunes and internal users in June 2013, and then for
Google Play in August 2013, and finally for Windows Store
in January 2014. The team internally set to get 30,000 users
by Summer 2014. The team did not have enough budget in
marketing, hence they used their personal network to attract
new users.
One of the existing location-based product on the market
at that moment was Google Latitude, which also allowed
users to see their locations on the map. However, Google
discontinued that service in 2013, hence Lokki got a lot of
users who switched from Latitude. To get more users, the
team intended to enter the US market. However it was not
easy to sell the product related to kids in US because there
was an online privacy protection act. The team needed legal
experts to find a way to enter the US market:
“We had dialogue with our in house lawyers and then
they found a legal consultant who advised to ask for
approval from user. So when I decide to use Lokki, it
will ask me that ‘Hey, am I under, 12 or 15?’ and if I
answer under that age, it will tell me that ‘Hey, do you
have permission from your guardians/parents for you to
use this?’ and then you can check a tip box, ‘Yes I have
permission.’ And they were happy with this approach.”
[Team Lead]
During the steer process, the team was monitored and
6evaluated by the management in every three months. The
first evaluation was done in May 2013, when the team did
the first demo to the management. In this evaluation, the
management wanted to see whether the team was able
to develop new product in a short cycle. In the past, the
company has one product per year with maybe two releases.
The internal startup team managed to create product from
the scratch and to release it on several platforms in three
months. Due to this success, all the team members got a
bonus of 2-3 months’ salary on top of their normal salary.
The management used two measures to evaluate the
team progress: number of users and user satisfaction. Num-
ber of users was based on the number of downloads from
the apps store e.g. Google Play or iTunes store. User satis-
faction was measured by NPS (Net Promotor Score). NPS
basically asks one question from the end users: whether
someone would promote the product to his friends or
colleagues. The answer is based on 0 to 10 scale.
In November 2013, there was a debate at the corporate
management level. There was no agreement on the contin-
uation of this product. Some of them wanted the team to
develop premium features, which was expected to bring
financial return to the company but others argued the other
way around: number of users first, then money. It was
unclear for the team what would be the target that needed
to be achieved:
“[It was] confusing even slightly demotivational also.”
[Team Lead]
The role of organisational champion was not recognised
in the case company during the steering process. When
the strategy changed, there was no one from corporate
management who protected the initiative. Moreover, there
was a change in the management that put team to a halt:
“So in a way we were, for three months we were in
a limbo, we were not even [receiving] high quality
guidance from the leadership team.” [Team Lead]
5.3 Accelerate
In Summer 2013, the company’s strategy was updated. The
people protection area was no longer inside the boundary of
the strategy. A new emphasis became more prominent in the
company?s strategy. However, the team did not react to this
situation. As described before, there was no organisational
champion who could protect the team. This situation made
it more difficult for the team to get additional support from
the rest of the company:
“We were not on their agenda at all. We were noise that
was distracting.” [Team Lead]
While the corporate management seemed like the per-
formance of the team and the product, the user growth was
small. The reason was the need of such product in Europe
was not big enough as compared to the US:
“Because the target segment was kids who were starting
schools and for the parents who could see where the kids
were. And in [the country] ... is pretty safe ... and no
accident so far, really... like one or two within ten years.”
[CIO]
In early 2014, the corporate management decided to re-
lease Lokki as an open source software project collaborated
with two universities in Europe and the US.
6 DISCUSSION
The reflection on the findings obtained from the F-Secure
case, in terms of what it has done well and should have
implemented in its internal startup experiment, and the re-
examination of the conceptual framework, led to a Lean
startup-enabled new product development model, as shown
in Fig. 2.
As illustrated in Fig. 2, the vision on the new product
should be co-defined by the management and the internal
startup team together. The management sets a boundary
where the new idea should fall within, and the team ex-
plores the concrete idea. The new idea is then pitched to
the management to get approval for development. While
Burgelman [20] suggests that the coaching from NVD is
needed in the internal startup process, it was absent in the
case of F-Secure. As described in Section 5.1, it was the
first time for F-Secure to develop a new product in the
internal startup manner. Therefore, there was no entity in
the company that could coach the team during the whole
project. If the NVD management existed, it should have
been involved in the co-definition of the vision as well.
The case study findings show that working in a startup
manner allows the team to easily communicate and talk
with their customers, which helps them to identify what
customers perceive value over the time. As a part of the
corporation, the team could easily get support from the rest
of the company. In the case of F-Secure, the internal startup
team did not have to pay anything for legal consultant
regarding the US market. Moreover, through the startup
manner, the team is able to get out of the bureaucratic
situation in creating the new product. However, this may
raise the tension inside the company because sometimes
they have to violate the standard operating procedures
which have been the backbone to manage the corporation.
To discover the real problem, Ries [19] suggests to in-
volve the customer since day one. In the F-Secure case,
instead of going out of the building, the team made as-
sumptions about the customer need by developing what
they thought could be the real problem and then relied on
the result of the focus group to test their assumptions (see
Section 5.2). Later, they learned that the need of that product
was not big enough to scale the production. The focus group
approach has severe limitations [40]. First, the results of
the test do not reflect the reaction of broader population.
Second, in focus group, customers are evaluating a verbal
description of a concept, which might not communicate
its true unique value proposition. Third, the results do not
reveal the customers’ real purchasing behaviour, only their
intentions to purchase. The Lean startup principles of going
out of the building and interact with real customers with
MVP to obtain feedback would have been a better way for
F-Secure to validate the product concept.
Ries [19] states that validated learning is a process where
entrepreneurs run experiment to validate their hypotheses
about the customer needs to reveal current and future busi-
ness prospects. Based on the results of hypotheses testing,
they must decide whether to persevere with the original
ideas or pivot to other directions. Ries [19] identifies ten
different types of pivot for startups. The reasons are related
to product, business model and engine of growth. In the
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Fig. 2. Lean startup-enabled new product development model
case of F-Secure, there were three pivots the internal startup
project had or should have conducted. The first is the
customer need pivot. As we can see in Section 5.2, the team
made wrong assumption about Lokki. The second is the
engine of growth pivot. After releasing the third version
of the product, the team realised that the user growth was
small. They learned that the need in the country where
they are operating was not big enough. When they tried to
penetrate to other countries, there were already competitors
that were offering better service. The third pivot that the
team should have done but did not was when the corporate
strategy changed. By not reacting to it, it made the product
development project out of the scope. As suggested by
[20], in this situation the role of organisational champion
is critical to convince top management either to change
strategy to protect the idea or to map the business idea in the
current strategy. This role is missing in the case of F-Secure.
Due to the single case study design, the findings of the
study cannot be generalised to other software companies
utilising internal startups for product innovation. Therefore,
the framework needs to be refined and evaluated with more
cases. The interviews could have been longer to allow a
greater depth, even though they were conducted in short
time to avoid the maturation threat [41] and boredom effect
[42] and to make the interviewees focus on the track.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Through software product innovation, large companies can
keep their position one step ahead of their competitors, and
startup initiative is considered a promising way to generate
software product innovation in large companies. However,
there is a lack of high quality studies on startup initiative
inside large software companies.
In this study, we developed a Lean startup-enabled new
product development model. The model describes the actual
process of both product and business development. We
identified the key activities of software product innovation
through internal startup in large software companies. The
model allows to take into consideration the learning oppor-
tunity in every activity.
The contributions of this study are two-folds. First, for
research community, our results contribute to an under-
standing of startup initiative inside large software compa-
nies to seek for innovation. Second, for practitioners, our
model could be used as a benchmark to better understand
and identify the opportunity to improve the current process
of internal startup for product innovation.
We envision a future study which will investigate how
effective internal startup can be for software product in-
novation and how it could be leveraged more effectively.
Moreover a comparative study on different companies is
needed as the basis to refine and evaluate the proposed
framework.
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